謬論

謬論（粵拼：mau6 leon6；英文：fallacy；希臘文：λογική πλάνη / logikí pláni），粵語口語又有嗌做謬誤或者誤謬，正式嚟講係指一啲用咗錯誤嘅邏輯嚟做推理嘅論證，而簡單啲講就係指一啲有問題嘅說服手法^[2]^[3]。舉個例說明，白馬非馬係一個喺漢字文化圈好出名嘅謬論。呢個謬論簡單啲講係噉嘅：因為白馬有「白色」呢一樣馬冇嘅特徵，所以白馬唔係馬^[4]。呢一個論證查實係一個謬論，分析如下：喺包括文言文同粵文在內嘅多種語文入面，「A 係 B」呢句嘢有至少兩個可能意思－佢可以係指

「A 同 B 係同一樣嘢」，又或者係指
「A 係 B 嘅一種」；

白馬同馬的確唔係同一樣嘢，但白馬係馬嘅一種，即係話「白馬係馬」呢句嘢喺第一個意思上唔合理，但喺第二個意思上係合理嘅。喺白馬非馬呢個所謂嘅論證當中，論證嗰個人撈亂咗「白馬係馬」呢句嘢嘅兩個可能意思，所以就出咗個謬論^[5]。

謬論好常見，喺大眾媒體等嘅地方都成日會出現，而且手法層出不窮^[6]：謬論有時係一聽就知唔合理嘅，但有人會用某啲技巧將謬論打扮成就噉聽落好似合理嘅論證－目的通常係要呃同老點人^[7]^[8]；有陣時，啲人又會犯錯，唔覺意用咗個謬論嚟諗住撐自己嘅觀點^[9]^[10]；而無論動機為何，有好多人都會將一啲諗深一層就知係謬論嘅諗法好信誓旦旦噉講出嚟，講到呢啲謬論好似係不證自明嘅噉^{[註 1]}。

分析謬論對批判思考嚟講好重要：分辨謬論唔係一件易事，有陣時有啲謬論就噉聽落好有說服力；再加上好多時一個論證會有好多個組成部份，當中某啲合理某啲係謬論^[11]^[12]。哲學當中有一套對謬論嘅詳細分析－即係分析「邊啲謬論係常見嘅」同「呢啲謬論點解唔合理」等等嘅問題，會將謬論分成形式謬論同非形式謬論等嘅種類^[13]^[14]。而學識分辨邊啲論證係謬論會幫到一個人睇穿其他人用嘅謬論同諗一啲真正合理嘅論證出嚟^[15]。

基礎概念

「謬論」呢隻漢字字詞，可以算得上係英文 fallacy 嘅對應：

「謬」呢隻漢字係一個象形字，當中「翏」係「寥」嘅省略，意為「空泛」，而「謬」字屬言部，所以「謬」可以理解做「空泛嘅言論」噉解^[16]；
英文字 fallacy 嚟自拉丁文嘅 fallacia，即係拉丁文入面大話或者騙局噉解；喺 16 世紀，fallacy 一詞正式俾西方哲學家攞嚟指「邏輯上唔合理嘅言論」^[17]－同粵語用到嘅謬論意思非常相似。

謬論喺日常用語嘅意思同嚴格學術分析上嘅定義有些少唔同：喺日常用語當中，謬論可以指泛指任何唔真確嘅諗法^[18]；不過喺嚴格嘅哲學同邏輯學分析上，謬論係論證嘅一種－一個用嚟嘗試說服人去信某啲諗法嘅論證^{[e 1]}包括咗一個特定系列嘅命題，呢柞命題當中有一部份係前件^{[e 2]}，啲前件之間會有啲邏輯關係，導致到成個論證得出一個結論^{[e 3]}，而個結論往往就係提出個論證嗰個人想說服人信嘅嘢，例如係以下呢幾句嘢噉，就係一個論證^[19]：

你哋公司需要一個識得統計嘅人才；（前件 1）

我識統計；（前件 2）

所以你哋應該請我。（結論）

一個論證未必係真確同合理嘅－喺哲學上，謬論正正就係指一啲荒謬嘅論證^[20]^[21]^{:p. 12}。喺廿一世紀，哲學同邏輯學界最常見嘅做法係將謬論分做兩大類－形式謬論同非形式謬論^[22]。

形式謬論

形式謬論^{[e 4]}指一啲結構上有問題嘅謬論。呢啲謬論有一啲唔合理嘅推理，搞到佢哋啲結論唔可以合理噉由前件嗰度推導出嚟－呢句嘢用邏輯學嘅行話講嘅話，就係呢啲論證衰喺唔具有邏輯效度^{[e 5]}。一個形式謬論實係有問題嘅，個謬論可以有真確嘅前件同埋結論，但問題係佢個結論唔可以合理噉樣由啲前件嗰度推出嚟，就算有一次半次俾個謬論咁啱撞彩撞到個真確嘅結論，個謬論都仲係包含咗一個唔合理嘅推理，所以下次用個謬論諗嘢嗰陣會得出唔真確結論嘅機會會好大。因為噉，一般認為，俾一個形式謬論做自己思考方式嘅一部份係會好容易得出唔真確嘅結論嘅^[7]。

有效嘅論證^{[e 6]}係形式謬論嘅相反：形式謬論衰喺佢啲結論唔能夠合理噉由前件嗰度推理出嚟。喺哲學同邏輯學上，「有效嘅論證」指緊某一類嘅論證，佢哋嘅結論係可以合理噉樣由啲前件命題嗰度推理出嚟嘅，所以如果佢啲前件命題係合理嘅話，噉佢個結論都實會合理（但如果啲前件唔真確，噉結論就未必真確）。用行話講嘅話就係，如果一個論證有效嘅話，噉前件真確會包保結論真確^[23]^[24]。

否定前項

否定前項^{[e 7]}係一種常見嘅形式謬論，指個論證靠否定一個前件嚟否定個前項嚟「證明」個後項。一個否定前項嘅謬論結構係以下噉樣嘅^[25]^[26]：

如果

{\text{P}}

係真確，

{\text{Q}}

就會係真確。

{\text{P}}

唔係真確。

結論：

{\text{Q}}

唔係真確。

舉個例說明：

如果一個人係蘇格拉底（

{\text{P}}

），噉「佢係一個人」（

{\text{Q}}

）呢句嘢會係真確，

{\text{P}}\rightarrow {\text{Q}}

。

阿里士多德唔係蘇格拉底（

{\text{P}}

唔真確）。

阿里士多德唔係一個人（荒謬嘅結論）。

否定前項呢個謬論可以用集合論^{[e 8]}嘅角度嚟思考。想像家陣有三個集， ${\text{A}}$ 、 ${\text{B}}$ 同 ${\text{C}}$ ，當中 ${\text{A}}$ 係 ${\text{B}}$ 嘅子集（簡單講即係屬 ${\text{A}}$ 嘅嘢冚唪唥都屬 ${\text{B}}$ ），而 ${\text{B}}$ 係 ${\text{C}}$ 嘅子集（睇下圖）。如果有嚿嘢屬 ${\text{A}}$ ，噉嚿嘢實會屬 ${\text{B}}$ ，但就算一嚿嘢唔屬 ${\text{A}}$ ，嚿嘢依然有可能會屬 ${\text{B}}$ ^[27]^[28]。

肯定後項

肯定後項^{[e 9]}係另一種出名嘅形式謬論，意思係指一啲透過肯定結果嚟到「肯定」個前件嘅論證，可以話係否定前項嘅相對。結構如下^[29]^[30]：

如果

{\text{P}}

係真確，

{\text{Q}}

就會係真確，

{\text{P}}\rightarrow {\text{Q}}

。

{\text{Q}}

係真確。

結論：

{\text{P}}

係真確。

又用返集合論例子，如果有嚿嘢屬 ${\text{A}}$ ，噉嚿嘢實會屬 ${\text{B}}$ ，但就算一嚿嘢屬 ${\text{B}}$ ，都唔表示嚿嘢屬 ${\text{A}}$ ^[27]。舉多幾個例子說明點解肯定後項呢種論證唔合理^[31]^[32]：

例論證 1: 如果一個人由廣州塔頂樓跌落嚟嘅話，噉佢會死；; 小強死咗；; 結論：小強由廣州塔嘅頂樓跌咗落嚟。（荒謬嘅結論；一個人死可以有好多原因。）
例論證 2: 如果一隻生物係一隻白馬嘅話，噉佢實係一隻馬；（白馬係馬嘅一種。）; 小強係一隻馬；; 結論：小強係一隻白馬。（荒謬嘅結論；世界上嘅馬唔係淨係得白馬。）

順帶一提，喺邏輯學上，「如果 ${\text{A}}$ 成立，噉 ${\text{B}}$ 都會成立」（^{[e 10]} 符號： ${\text{A}}\rightarrow {\text{B}}$ ）呢啲句子就係所謂嘅直陳條件^{[e 11]}，如果「上述呢句句子成立」而且「 ${\text{A}}$ 成立」，噉 ${\text{B}}$ 都會成立；喺肯定後項謬論當中，講謬論嗰個人講「 ${\text{B}}$ 成立，所以 ${\text{A}}$ 成立」－問題係，

「如果

{\text{A}}

成立，噉

{\text{B}}

都會成立」（

{\text{A}}\rightarrow {\text{B}}

）同埋

「如果

{\text{B}}

成立，噉

{\text{A}}

都會成立」（

{\text{B}}\rightarrow {\text{A}}

）

係兩句唔一樣嘅句子^[33]。

非形式謬論

非形式謬論^{[e 12]}同形式謬論唔同，指一啲衰喺前件嘅內容有問題嘅謬論。非形式謬論可能係有效嘅，但就算一個論證有效，都只不過係表示「如果啲前件真確，噉個結論都會係真確」－即係話一個前件唔真確嘅有效論證係可以俾出唔真確嘅結論嘅^[22]。例如係頭先提到嘅直陳條件噉，假設家陣

「如果 ${\text{A}}$ 成立，噉 ${\text{B}}$ 都會成立」（ ${\text{A}}\rightarrow {\text{B}}$ ）呢句嘢成立；而且
${\text{A}}$ 成立，

噉嘅話 ${\text{B}}$ 都實會成立，但問題係，假如提出論證嘅人因為手上資訊不足等嘅原因，搞到佢錯誤噉以為 ${\text{A}}$ 成立（ ${\text{A}}$ 實際上唔成立），噉呢個論證最後都會成為一個謬論，而且係一個非形式謬論^[13]。

例論證 1: 蘇格拉底係一個人；（ ${\text{A}}$ 係「係人」，而 ${\text{A}}$ 喺蘇格拉底身上成立）; 所有人條命都係有限嘅；（ ${\text{A}}\rightarrow {\text{B}}$ ，當中 ${\text{B}}$ 係「條命係有限嘅」）; 所以蘇格拉底條命係有限嘅。（結論： ${\text{B}}$ 喺蘇格拉底身上成立）^[34]

例論證 2: 神犬拉西係一個人；（聲稱： ${\text{A}}$ 喺神犬拉西身上成立）; 所有人條命都係有限嘅；（ ${\text{A}}\rightarrow {\text{B}}$ ）; 所以神犬拉西條命係有限嘅。（真確嘅結論： ${\text{B}}$ 喺神犬拉西身上成立）

論證 2 係一個有問題嘅論證。雖然佢個結論係真確，但佢成個論證依然有問題：論證 2 個結構同論證 1 嘅一個版，所以佢錯唔係錯喺個論證嘅結構，而係喺佢前件嘅內容嗰度－神犬拉西係一隻狗，唔係一個人。一個論證有一柞命題，啲命題有內容，而命題同命題之間以及命題同結論之間會有住因果等嘅邏輯關係，論證 2 啲命題同結論之間嘅關係冇問題，但佢嗰句前件嘅內容有問題^[22]^[34]。

直陳條件嘅結構係合理嘅－直陳條件嘅做法係有效嘅論證，而且亦都係一種喺數學同電腦科學等嘅領域嗰度都會用到嘅一種論證，但由啲例子嗰度經已睇得出，就算一個論證係有效嘅都好，如果啲前件有問題，噉個結論都可能會出事。因為噉，一個完全合理嘅論證一定要有齊兩樣嘢：個論證要有效，而且啲前件要真確。有咗一個有效而且啲前件真確嘅論證，就會達到一個本身真確又可以合理噉由前件推出嚟嘅結論^[34]^[35]。

非形式謬論可以用「錯嘅方法」嚟分類^[36]：

語義謬誤

白馬到底係唔係「馬」？喺答呢條問題之前，討論嘅人應該搞清楚「係」呢個字係乜嘢意思先。

語義謬誤^{[e 13]}就係一種非形式謬論。好似係白馬非馬嘅個案噉，一個人嘗試說服人相信「白馬非馬」呢一個荒謬嘅結論。佢用咗一連串似是疑非嘅論證，好古惑噉利用咗「非」呢個字嘅歧義^{[e 14]}，因為非一字－同埋個字喺上古漢語以及文言文等語文嘅對應－可以有最少兩個唔同嘅含意，解做「唔等同」又得，解做「唔屬於」又得，所以「白馬非馬」呢句嘢有兩個可能嘅定義^[37]^[38]：

「白馬」同「馬」唔係同一樣嘢。
「白馬」唔屬於「馬」呢個類別。

第一句嘢係真確嘅，因為馬仲包含咗黑馬同灰馬等多種嘅馬，所以白馬同馬唔係同一樣嘢，但白馬係馬嘅一種，所以第二句嘢係唔真確嘅。講嘢嘅人利用咗關鍵詞彚嘅歧義嚟詏「白馬唔係馬」，犯咗語義謬誤。佢個詏法流程如下^[39]：

如果話「A 係 B」，噉 A 同 B 應該喺所有特徵上相等；（前件 1）

「白馬」有「白色」呢一樣「馬」冇嘅特徵；（前件 2）

所以白馬唔係馬。（結論）

呢個係一個非形式謬論，佢個結構如下：

如果話「A 同 B 相等」，噉 A 同 B 應該喺所有特徵上相等；（前件 1）

「X」有「Z」呢一樣「Y」冇嘅特徵；（前件 2）

所以 X 同 Y 唔相等。（結論）

呢個論證嘅結構好合理，問題在於公孫龍跟手將「白馬同馬唔相等」呢個合理同真確嘅結論攞嚟詏「白馬唔屬於馬」^[39]。

唔啦更謬論

唔啦更謬論^{[e 15]}係一種非形式謬論，指講緊謬論嗰個人個論證未必係唔合理或者唔真確，但實際上根本冇處理到講嗰個人處理緊嘅問題，諗深一層就知道同講緊嘅嘢冇啦更^{[e 16]}。啲人之所以會犯唔啦更謬論有好多原因，有啲人可能係唔覺意，但又有啲人係因為唔夠人詏所以專登用呢類手法詐詐諦引開注意力。唔啦更謬論有好多種^[40]^[41]：

人身攻擊

人身攻擊謬論^{[e 17]}就係一種俾人指喺政治場合成日都見到嘅唔啦更謬論，指啲人－通常因為撞到對手講咗一個自己搞唔掂嘅論證－而忽視對方個論證，改為攻擊對手，質疑對方嘅人格、動機、態度、地位、階級或者處境^[42]^[43]，好似係以下呢場對話入面嘅 B 君噉^[44]：

A 君：我認為進化論係合理嘅，因為有好多證據顯示...（詳請睇進化論嘅證據）

B 君：超，你信進化論只不過係因為你係一個無神論者之嘛。

A 君：無論呢啲證據由邊個開口講出嚟嘅，證據就係證據。仲有，我係一個不可知論者。

喺呢場對話入面，B 君避開唔直接噉應對 A 君個論證，而改為攻擊佢嘅個人動機，但哲學界一般認為，一個描述緊客觀事實嘅論證合唔合理係唔應該受制於講嗰個人嘅身份嘅，而正如 A 君所講嘅噉，無論呢啲理據由一個天主教徒、佛教徒定係任何人開口講出嚟，都仲會係理據。B 君用人身攻擊嘅原因有好多，可能佢覺得佢冇能力正面噉回應 A 君個論證，又或者佢真係以為人身攻擊可以幫到佢否定 A 君啲證據^[44]^[45]。

草人謬論

草人謬論^{[e 18]}係一種好出名嘅唔啦更謬論，指講緊謬論嗰個人將對手提倡嘅立場講成第個易駁啲－但實際上根本唔啦更－嘅立場，然後再辯駁呢個易駁嘅立場，駁完之後仲要扮到好似成功噉駁斥咗對手真係主張緊嗰個立場噉。由頭到尾，講緊謬論嗰個人查實都係喺度攻擊緊一個佢對手冇主張過嘅立場^[46]。好似係以下呢個例子噉樣：

A 君：我信不可知論嘅，即係話我對上帝係咪存在抱持唔肯定嘅態度。（對手提出咗個立場）

B 君：超，你噉講即係話人類唔使要道德啦，隨街殺人放火強姦都得喇喎？你個立場根本就係錯嘅！（將對手個立場曲解做第個易駁嘅立場；宗教同道德係咪有必然關係？）

A 君：我都冇噉講過，我淨係話我唔信宗教之嘛。你喺度曲解緊我講嘅嘢。

使用草人謬論嘅手法步驟如下^[47]：

等對手提出一個主張；
斷章取義：諗第個主張出來，呢個新主張就噉望落要有些少似對手嗰個主張，而且易駁啲－但實際上根本唔啦更嘅；
駁斥嗰個新主張；
扮到駁到嗰個新主張就好似成功駁咗對手真係講緊嘅嗰個主張噉。

草人謬論係唔啦更謬論嘅一種：因為草人謬論根本冇應付到對手個立場，而係靠講一啲唔啦更嘅嘢扮到好似駁到對手個立場噉。

常見類型

以下係哲學同邏輯學上比較常分析嘅謬論類型^[34]^[48]：

形式類型

...等等。

非形式類型

...等等。

認知研究

認知心理學研究人嘅認知功能，包括思考，所以有認知心理學家研究「點解好多人都會受到諗深一層就知係謬論嘅論證說服？」嘅問題。喺最基本上，認知心理學界一致贊同嘅係，人之所以會信謬論，其中一個主因係啟發法^{[e 19]}：人並唔係完全理性嘅，而係會用好多「多數時候都啱使」嘅思考捷徑嚟務求快速噉處理資訊，呢啲思考捷徑就係所謂嘅啟發法^[49]^[50]，例如人好多時都唔夠時間處理嗮理解一個論證所需嘅知識，於是就改為靠睇講嗰個人嘅人品嚟對個論證作出判斷－可能會出現人身攻擊謬論^[51]。

貝葉斯腦假說^{[e 20]}係認知科學上嘅一個假說。根據貝葉斯腦假說，一個心靈學習嗰陣係做緊貝氏推論^{[e 21]}，即係話個心靈會透過自己過去嘅經驗，計算一大柞機會率數值，以此表示自己對「世界係點運作」嘅認識，而呢個知識表示就係所謂嘅「對世界嘅內部模型」^{[e 22]}－假想有兩件事件， $A$ 同 $B$ ， $P(A)$ 係 $A$ 發生嘅機會率， $P(B)$ 係 $B$ 發生嘅機會率，根據貝葉斯定理^{[e 23]}， $P(A|B)$ （已知 $B$ 發生咗， $A$ 發生嘅機會率）可以用以下呢條式計^[52]：

P(A|B)={\frac {P(B|A)\,P(A)}{P(B)}}

舉個例說明，有一個地區，個地區嘅人當中有 0.1% 嘅都有一隻病（ $P(A)=0.001$ ）；而家有個新測試（「測試出陽性反應」係 $B$ ），而打前嘅醫學研究顯示，如果個病人真係有嗰隻病，個測試有 90% 機會呈陽性反應（ $P(B|A)=0.9$ ），但就算個病人冇嗰隻病（ $A'$ ），個測試都有 9% 嘅機會呈陽性反應（ $P(B|A')=0.09$ ， $P(B)$ 大約係 0.1）。家吓有個住喺呢個地區嘅人去做咗個測試，出咗陽性結果，用貝葉斯定理嚟計嘅話，佢真係有嗰種病嘅機會率（ $P(A|B)$ ）大約係 10% （個測試唔多靠得住）^[52]。

有學者指，某啲類型嘅謬論之所以能夠說服人，可以用貝葉斯腦假說嘅原理想像：多數人唔夠時間資源處理嗮「做完美理性判斷」所需嘅資訊；所以佢哋就要用思考捷徑判斷「睇緊嗰個論證係正確」嘅機會率（ $P(A)$ ），而佢哋可能因為過往嘅經驗而學到「如果某個人嘅身份係噉噉噉（ $P(B)$ ），佢提出嘅論證係錯誤嘅機會率（ $P(A'|B)$ ）會好高」，並且靠呢種認知捷徑做判斷，就會引致人身攻擊謬論可能出現^[53]。

概念史

人類史上第一個有系統噉分析謬論嘅人係公元前 384 - 322 年嘅古希臘哲學家阿里士多德^{[e 24]}；阿里士多德嘅定言三段論^{[e 25]}為論證結構定立咗個基礎－佢指出有好多常用嘅思考方法都係諗深一層就知有問題嘅，佢將佢所觀察到嘅謬論列嗮出嚟^[54]；跟住佢仲分析呢啲謬論點解有問題，並且將嗰時觀察到嘅謬論分做「語言謬論」同「非語言謬論」兩大類^[55]^[56]－前者指一啲因為用字遣詞相關嘅問題而起嘅謬論，例如係用字不當或者語義謬誤等嘅問題^[57]，而後者指同講嘅內容相關嘅謬論，就算換返啲字眼都仲會係錯^[58]^[59]。

到咗家陣，阿里士多德嗰個謬論分類法經已好少可有人用，不過佢嘅思想係邏輯學嘅根基，而打後嘅哲學家仲有繼續將呢套思想發展上去：例如著名嘅 17 世紀英國哲學家培根^{[e 26]}都有落筆探討有關謬論嘅議題^[60]；而澳洲哲學家同邏輯學家咸貝連^{[e 27]}喺 1970 年出咗本書專講謬論相關嘅問題，係現代第一本成本都淨係講謬論嘅書，哈姆貝林批評當時嘅哲學教育唔夠重視由邏輯學嘅角度分析謬論^[61]，俾人指係令到廿一世紀哲學再重視研究謬論嘅原因之一^[62]。

註釋

↑ 可以睇睇煤氣燈效應嘅概念。

睇埋

文獻

以下係一啲講謬論嘅文獻：

C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies, Methuen London, 1970. reprinted by Vale Press in 1998 as ISBN 0-916475-24-7.
Hans V. Hansen; Robert C. Pinto (1995). Fallacies: classical and contemporary readings. Penn State Press. ISBN 978-0-271-01417-3.
Frans van Eemeren; Bart Garssen; Bert Meuffels (2009). Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness: Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion. Springer. ISBN 978-90-481-2613-2.
Douglas N. Walton, Informal logic: A handbook for critical argumentation. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Douglas, Walton (1987). Informal Fallacies. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Walton, Douglas (1995). A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Walton, Douglas (2010). "Why Fallacies Appear to Be Better Arguments than They Are". Informal Logic. 30 (2): 159–184.
John Woods (2004). The death of argument: fallacies in agent based reasoning. Springer. ISBN 978-1-4020-2663-8.
Fearnside, W. Ward and William B. Holther, Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument, 1959.
Vincent F. Hendricks, Thought 2 Talk: A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression, New York: Automatic Press / VIP, 2005, ISBN 87-991013-7-8
D. H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, Harper Torchbooks, 1970.
Warburton Nigel, Thinking from A to Z, Routledge 1998.
Sagan, Carl, "The Demon-Haunted World: Science As a Candle in the Dark". Ballantine Books, March 1997 ISBN 0-345-40946-9, 480 pgs. 1996 hardback edition: Random House, ISBN 0-394-53512-X, xv+457 pages plus addenda insert (some printings). Ch.12.
（中文）李天命，《哲道行者（最終定本）》，2009. ISBN 9789888026371.
（中文）李天命，《李天命的思考藝術（最終定本）》，2009.
（中文）李天命，《殺悶思維（最終定本）》，2010. ISBN 9789888027866.

而以下就係一啲講謬論嘅古典文獻：

Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, De Sophistici Elenchi. library.adelaide.edu.au
William of Ockham, Summa of Logic (ca. 1323) Part III.4.
John Buridan, Summulae de dialectica Book VII.
Francis Bacon, the doctrine of the idols in Novum Organum Scientiarum, Aphorisms concerning The Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man, XXIIIff. fly.hiwaay.net
Arthur Schopenhauer, The Art of Controversy | Die Kunst, Recht zu behalten - The Art Of Controversy (bilingual), (also known as "Schopenhauers 38 stratagems"). gutenberg.net
John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic - Raciocinative and Inductive. Book 5, Chapter 7, Fallacies of Confusion. la.utexas.edu.

引咗

篇文用咗嘅行話或者專有名詞，英文（或者其他外語）名如下：

↑ argument
↑ premise
↑ conclusion
↑ formal fallacy；拉丁文：non sequitur，即係拉丁文入面都跟唔到噉解。
↑ logical validity
↑ valid argument
↑ denying the antecedent
↑ set theory
↑ affirming the consequent
↑ If ${\text{A}}$ is true, then ${\text{B}}$ is true
↑ indicative conditional
↑ informal fallacy
↑ equivocation
↑ ambiguity
↑ fallacies of relevance；拉丁文：ignoratio elenchi，唔理一個反駁噉解。
↑ relevance
↑ 拉丁文：ad hominem
↑ straw man fallacy
↑ heuristics
↑ Bayesian brain hypothesis
↑ Bayesian inference
↑ internal model of the world
↑ Bayes' theorem
↑ Aristotle；希臘文：Ἀριστοτέλης
↑ syllogism
↑ Francis Bacon
↑ Charles Hamblin

篇文引用咗以下呢啲文獻同網頁：

↑ Frans, van Eemeren; Bart, Garssen; Bert, Meuffels (2009). "1". Fallacies and judgements of reasonableness, Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. p. 2.
↑ van Eemeren, Frans; Garssen, Bart; Meuffels, Bert (2009). Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonablene Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer.
↑ Argument, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "In everyday life, we often use the word "argument" to mean a verbal dispute or disagreement. This is not the way this word is usually used in philosophy. However, the two uses are related. Normally, when two people verbally disagree with each other, each person attempts to convince the other that his or her viewpoint is the right one. Unless he or she merely results to name calling or threats, he or she typically presents an argument for his or her position, in the sense described above. In philosophy, arguments are those statements a person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or present reasons for accepting a given conclusion".
↑ 《戰國策》〈趙策〉：「夫刑名之家，皆曰：白馬非馬也。」
↑ Damer, T. Edward (21 February 2008). Attacking Faulty Reasoning: A Practical Guide to Fallacy-Free Arguments. Cengage Learning. pp. 121–123.
↑ McMurtry, John (December 1990). "The mass media: An analysis of their system of fallacy". Interchange. 21 (4): 49–66.
↑ ^7.0 ^7.1 Harry J. Gensler, The A to Z of Logic (2010:p74). Rowman & Littlefield.
↑ Woods, John (2004). The Death of Argument. Applied Logic Series. 32. pp. 3–23.
↑ Bustamente, Thomas; Dahlman, Christian, eds. (2015). Argument types and fallacies in legal argumentation. Heidelberg: Springer International Publishing. p. x.
↑ Boyer, Web; Stoddard, Samuel. "How to Be Persuasive 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2018年7月27號，.". Rink Works.
↑ DeLancey, Craig, Ph.D. "Evaluating Arguments—Distinguishing between reasonable and fallacious tactics 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2013年9月3號，." (PDF). oswego.edu.
↑ Shewan, Edward (2003). "Soundness of Argument". Applications of Grammar: Principles of Effective Communication (2nd ed.). Christian Liberty Press.
↑ ^13.0 ^13.1 Informal Fallacies.
↑ Fallacies. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
↑ Why study fallacies?.
↑ 謬互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2019年6月20號，..
↑ What is a Logical Fallacy, Exactly?. Logically Fallicious.
↑ FALLACY. Cambridge Dictionary.
↑ Argument 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2019年3月25號，.. Philosophy Terms.
↑ Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. A. (1977). Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. US Edition. (2006). New York: Idebate Press.
↑ Hamblin, C. Fallacies. London: Methuen, 1970.
↑ ^22.0 ^22.1 ^22.2 Walton, D. N. (1987). Informal fallacies (Vol. 4). John Benjamins Publishing.
↑ Validity and Soundness 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2018年5月27號，.. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
↑ L. T. F. Gamut, Logic, Language, and Meaning: Introduction to Logic, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 115.
↑ Moldovan, A. (2009). Pragmatic considerations in the interpretation of denying the antecedent. Informal Logic, 29(3), 309-326.
↑ Burke, M. B. (1994). Denying the Antecedent: A Common Fallacy?. Informal Logic, 16(1).
↑ ^27.0 ^27.1 Kunen, Kenneth (1980), Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs, North-Holland.
↑ Potter, Michael (2004), Set Theory and Its Philosophy: A Critical Introduction, Oxford University Press.
↑ Rice, S. M. (2010). Conspicuous logic: using the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent as a litigation tool. Barry L. Rev., 14, 1.
↑ Bowles, G. (1996). Affirming the consequent. Argumentation, 10(4), 429-444.
↑ Damer, T. Edward (2001). "Confusion of a Necessary with a Sufficient Condition". Attacking Faulty Reasoning (4th ed.). Wadsworth. p. 150.
↑ Heller, Joseph (1994). Catch-22. Vintage. pp. 438, 8.
↑ Kaufmann, S. (2005). Conditional truth and future reference. Journal of Semantics, 22(3), 231-280.
↑ ^34.0 ^34.1 ^34.2 ^34.3 Copi, Irving M.; Cohen, Carl (2005). Introduction to Logic (12 ed.). Pearson Education, Inc.
↑ Pirie, Madsen (2006). How to Win Every Argument: The Use and Abuse of Logic. A&C Black. p. 46.
↑ Informal fallacy 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2019年7月14號，..
↑ （中文）程樹銘, & 張忠義. (2003). 也談公孫龍的 "白馬非馬" (Doctoral dissertation).
↑ （中文）張春泉. (2001). 白馬非馬: 修辭式推論. 修辭學習, 1, 24-25.
↑ ^39.0 ^39.1 （中文）張章騄, & 王四達. (1995). "白馬非馬" 還是詭辯── 與李其祥先生商榷. 華僑大學學報 (哲學社會科學版), (01).
↑ Bishop Whately, cited by John Stuart Mill: A System of Logic. London Colchester 1959 (first: 1843), pp. 542.
↑ Patrick J. Hurley (2011). A Concise Introduction to Logic. Cengage Learning. pp. 131–133.
↑ Dr. Michael C. Labossiere (2002–2010). "42 Fallacies: Ad Hominem" (PDF). p. 2.
↑ Walton, Douglas (1998). Ad Hominem Arguments. University of Alabama Press. pp. 18–21.
↑ ^44.0 ^44.1 Nieminen, P., & Mustonen, A. M. (2014). Argumentation and fallacies in creationist writings against evolutionary theory. Evolution: Education and Outreach, 7(1), 11.
↑ "Character Attacks: How to Properly Apply the Ad Hominem". Scientific American Mind.
↑ Logically Fallacious - Strawman Fallacy
↑ Bosanac, Paul (2009). Litigation Logic: A Practical Guide to Effective Argument. American Bar Association. p. 393.
↑ Bennett, Bo (2012). Logically Fallacious: The Ultimate Collection of Over 300 Logical Fallacies (Academic Edition). Archieboy Holdings.
↑ Rogers, P., Davis, T., & Fisk, J. (2009). Paranormal belief and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (PDF). Applied Cognitive Psychology: The Official Journal of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 23(4), 524-542.
↑ Wiseman, R., & Watt, C. (2006). Belief in psychic ability and the misattribution hypothesis: A qualitative review. British Journal of Psychology, 97, 323–338.
↑ Lillo-Unglaube, M., Canales-Johnson, A., Navarrete, G., & Bravo, C. F. (2014). Toward an experimental account of argumentation: the case of the slippery slope and the ad hominem arguments. Frontiers in psychology, 5, 1420.
↑ ^52.0 ^52.1 The Bayesian Brain Hypothesis. Towards Data Science.
↑ Harris, A. J., Hsu, A. S., & Madsen, J. K. (2012). Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2017年10月28號，. (PDF). Thinking & Reasoning, 18(3), 311-343.
↑ Frans, van Eemeren; Bart, Garssen; Bert, Meuffels (2009). "1". Fallacies and judgements of reasonableness, Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. p. 2.
↑ "Aristotle's original 13 fallacies". The Non Sequitur.
↑ "Aristotle's 13 fallacies 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2018年7月18號，.". www.logiclaw.co.uk.
↑ "PHIL 495: Philosophical Writing (Spring 2008), Texas A&M University".
↑ Frans, van Eemeren; Bart, Garssen; Bert, Meuffels (2009). "1". Fallacies and judgements of reasonableness, Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. p. 3.
↑ Frans, van Eemeren; Bart, Garssen; Bert, Meuffels (2009). "1". Fallacies and judgements of reasonableness, Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. p. 4.
↑ Bacon, F., 1620, The New Organon, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, (1960).
↑ Hamblin, C. L., (1970). Fallacies, London: Methuen.
↑ C.L. Hamblin, "Fallacies".

拎

（英文）謬論，史丹福哲學百科全書講解謬論。
- （英文）謬論快勞：非形式謬論
（英文） Nikzor.org - 42 個非形式邏輯謬論
（英文）可互動嘅定言三段論機器
（英文）謬論同辯論嘅藝術
（英文）謬論，由文學角度睇謬論。

[11] 可以睇睇煤氣燈效應嘅概念。

[20] rgument

[21] remise

[22] usion

[27] rmal fallacy；拉丁文：non sequitur，即係拉丁文入面都跟唔到噉解。

[28] validity

[29] valid argument

[32] ying the antecedent

[35] set theory

[38] rming the consequent

[43] If ${\text{A}}$ is true, then ${\text{B}}$ is true

[44] tive conditional

[46] rmal fallacy

[50] quivocation

[51] uity

[55] s of relevance；拉丁文：ignoratio elenchi，唔理一個反駁噉解。

[56] relevance

[59] 拉丁文：ad hominem

[64] straw man fallacy

[68] uristics

[72] Bayesian brain hypothesis

[73] Bayesian inference

[74] ternal model of the world

[75] Bayes' theorem

[78] Aristotle；希臘文：Ἀριστοτέλης

[79] syllogism

[86] Francis Bacon

[88] Charles Hamblin

[1] Frans, van Eemeren; Bart, Garssen; Bert, Meuffels (2009). "1". Fallacies and judgements of reasonableness, Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. p. 2.

[2] van Eemeren, Frans; Garssen, Bart; Meuffels, Bert (2009). Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonablene Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules. Dordrecht: Springer.

[3] Argument, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "In everyday life, we often use the word "argument" to mean a verbal dispute or disagreement. This is not the way this word is usually used in philosophy. However, the two uses are related. Normally, when two people verbally disagree with each other, each person attempts to convince the other that his or her viewpoint is the right one. Unless he or she merely results to name calling or threats, he or she typically presents an argument for his or her position, in the sense described above. In philosophy, arguments are those statements a person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or present reasons for accepting a given conclusion".

[4] 《戰國策》〈趙策〉：「夫刑名之家，皆曰：白馬非馬也。」

[5] Damer, T. Edward (21 February 2008). Attacking Faulty Reasoning: A Practical Guide to Fallacy-Free Arguments. Cengage Learning. pp. 121–123.

[6] McMurtry, John (December 1990). "The mass media: An analysis of their system of fallacy". Interchange. 21 (4): 49–66.

[gensler-7] 7.0 ^7.1 Harry J. Gensler, The A to Z of Logic (2010:p74). Rowman & Littlefield.

[8] Woods, John (2004). The Death of Argument. Applied Logic Series. 32. pp. 3–23.

[9] Bustamente, Thomas; Dahlman, Christian, eds. (2015). Argument types and fallacies in legal argumentation. Heidelberg: Springer International Publishing. p. x.

[10] Boyer, Web; Stoddard, Samuel. "How to Be Persuasive 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2018年7月27號，.". Rink Works.

[12] DeLancey, Craig, Ph.D. "Evaluating Arguments—Distinguishing between reasonable and fallacious tactics 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2013年9月3號，." (PDF). oswego.edu.

[13] Shewan, Edward (2003). "Soundness of Argument". Applications of Grammar: Principles of Effective Communication (2nd ed.). Christian Liberty Press.

[inform-14] 13.0 ^13.1 Informal Fallacies.

[15] Fallacies. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[16] Why study fallacies?.

[17] 謬互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2019年6月20號，..

[18] What is a Logical Fallacy, Exactly?. Logically Fallicious.

[19] FALLACY. Cambridge Dictionary.

[philterms-23] Argument 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2019年3月25號，.. Philosophy Terms.

[24] Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. A. (1977). Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. US Edition. (2006). New York: Idebate Press.

[25] Hamblin, C. Fallacies. London: Methuen, 1970.

[walton1987-26] 22.0 ^22.1 ^22.2 Walton, D. N. (1987). Informal fallacies (Vol. 4). John Benjamins Publishing.

[30] Validity and Soundness 互聯網檔案館嘅歸檔，歸檔日期2018年5月27號，.. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[31] L. T. F. Gamut, Logic, Language, and Meaning: Introduction to Logic, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 115.

[33] Moldovan, A. (2009). Pragmatic considerations in the interpretation of denying the antecedent. Informal Logic, 29(3), 309-326.

[34] Burke, M. B. (1994). Denying the Antecedent: A Common Fallacy?. Informal Logic, 16(1).

[kunen1980-36] 27.0 ^27.1 Kunen, Kenneth (1980), Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs, North-Holland.

[37] Potter, Michael (2004), Set Theory and Its Philosophy: A Critical Introduction, Oxford University Press.

[39] Rice, S. M. (2010). Conspicuous logic: using the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent as a litigation tool. Barry L. Rev., 14, 1.

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