機制設計

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機制設計嘅抽象圖解

機制設計粵拼gei1 zai3 cit3 gai3英文mechanism design)係經濟學(economics)同博弈論(game theory)嘅一個子領域,重點係採取一個工程學嘅思考方式嚟設計經濟科學會運用科學方法了解世界,而工程學就係靠科學得到嘅知識嘗試設計出有用嘅技術;經濟學同機制設計之間嘅關係一樣-經濟學運用科學方法研究人類分配有限資源嘅過程,而機制設計就會運用經濟學得到嘅知識,務求設計出適當嘅政策,令人類有足夠嘅誘因做出政策制定者想佢哋做嘅決策[1][2]。機制設計又有叫掉轉博弈論reverse game theory)-博弈論分析做嘅係由一個經濟環境嘅規則,預計決策者會做出乜行為,而機制設計就掉返轉,做嘅嘢係由「想要嘅行為」做起點,再思考要制定乜嘢規則先可以引誘人做出呢啲行為[3]

想像幅附圖:附圖左上角嘅空間 包含可能採取嘅行動同策略,而右上角嘅空間 X 包含可能嘅報償, 函數講明每個行動或者策略 嘅相應報償, 代表機制設計者向博弈者傳達嘅訊息, 代表個博弈環境,均衡狀態 要設計成達到某啲特定嘅

步驟[編輯]

做機制設計嘅步驟大致上如下[4]

  • 定義是次機制設計嘅目的,想要引誘人做出乜行為;
  • 由每個個體嘅角度出發,用博弈論思考嗰個個體嘅效益(utility)函數係乜樣,當中可以涉及行為經濟學嘅考量(例: 代表個人做理想行為會得到嘅滿足感, 等代表已知會影響滿足感嘅因素),得出一個描述個體行為嘅數學模型
  • 運用微積分等嘅數學技術,計吓柞因素( 等)要設成乜數值,先可以令個人做出理想行為嘅機率最大化(,假設 最大化等如個人會做理想行為嘅機率都最大化)-如果柞因素係政策制定者有權力控制嘅,噉就可以得出一個「要採取乜行動」嘅具體計劃。

睇埋[編輯]

參考文獻[編輯]

  • Clarke, Edward H. (1971). "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods" (PDF). Public Choice. 11 (1): 17–33. doi:10.1007/BF01726210. JSTOR 30022651.
  • Gibbard, Allan (1973). "Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result" (PDF). Econometrica. 41 (4): 587–601. doi:10.2307/1914083. JSTOR 1914083.
  • Groves, Theodore (1973). "Incentives in Teams" (PDF). Econometrica. 41 (4): 617–631. doi:10.2307/1914085. JSTOR 1914085.
  • Harsanyi, John C. (1967). "Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players, I-III. part I. The Basic Model". Management Science. 14 (3): 159–182. doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159. JSTOR 2628393.
  • Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation". Review of Economic Studies. 38 (2): 175–208. doi:10.2307/2296779. JSTOR 2296779.
  • Myerson, Roger B.; Satterthwaite, Mark A. (1983). "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading". Journal of Economic Theory. 29 (2): 265–281. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0.
  • Satterthwaite, Mark Allen (1975). "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions". Journal of Economic Theory. 10 (2): 187–217. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.471.9842. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2.
  • Vickrey, William (1961). "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders" (PDF). The Journal of Finance. 16 (1): 8–37.

參考書[編輯]

[編輯]

  1. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American economic review, 93(3), 729-747.
  2. Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., & Tang, J. (2012, August). Crowdsourcing to smartphones: Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. In Proceedings of the 18th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking (pp. 173-184). ACM.
  3. Mechanism Design Theory.
  4. Bowles, S., & Hwang, S. H. (2008). Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives. Journal of Public Economics, 92(8-9), 1811-1820.

[編輯]

  • Eric Maskin, "Nobel Prize Lecture" delivered on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University.